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Abstract
Global greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions can be traced to five economic sectors: energy, industry,
buildings, transport and AFOLU (agriculture, forestry and other land uses). In this topical review,
we synthesise the literature to explain recent trends in global and regional emissions in each of
these sectors. To contextualise our review, we present estimates of GHG emissions trends by sector
© 2021 The Author(s). Published by IOP Publishing Ltd
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from 1990 to 2018, describing the major sources of emissions growth, stability and decline across
ten global regions. Overall, the literature and data emphasise that progress towards reducing GHG
emissions has been limited. The prominent global pattern is a continuation of underlying drivers
with few signs of emerging limits to demand, nor of a deep shift towards the delivery of low and
zero carbon services across sectors. We observe a moderate decarbonisation of energy systems in
Europe and North America, driven by fuel switching and the increasing penetration of renewables.
By contrast, in rapidly industrialising regions, fossil-based energy systems have continuously
expanded, only very recently slowing down in their growth. Strong demand for materials, floor
area, energy services and travel have driven emissions growth in the industry, buildings and
transport sectors, particularly in Eastern Asia, Southern Asia and South-East Asia. An expansion of
agriculture into carbon-dense tropical forest areas has driven recent increases in AFOLU emissions
in Latin America, South-East Asia and Africa. Identifying, understanding, and tackling the most
persistent and climate-damaging trends across sectors is a fundamental concern for research and
policy as humanity treads deeper into the Anthropocene.
1. Introduction
Greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions from fossil fuels
and land use have continuously grown since the 19th
century, reaching their highest ever level in 2019. The
Paris Agreement in 2015 set out an ambition to limit
the global temperature increase to 1.5 ◦C and 2 ◦C
above pre-industrial levels. Yet, on the basis of cur-
rent trends in emissions, planned infrastructure, and
national policy commitments, the Paris targets are in
jeopardy (Höhne et al 2020). The timewindow is nar-
rowing to counter these trends across all sectors and
global regions.
Global GHG emissions sources are usually
attributed to five broad sectors, characterised by
the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
(IPCC) Working Group III (WG3) as energy sys-
tems, industry, buildings, transport, and AFOLU
(agriculture, forestry and other land uses). Together,
these sectors cover aspects of energy supply (energy
systems), energy demand (industry, buildings and
transport), non-energy related process emissions
(industry), and land-based emissions and removals
(AFOLU).
Each sector encounters its own challenges in
terms of climate change mitigation. GHG emissions
from energy systems are dominated by coal-powered
electricity generation, often from a limited number of
highly polluting units that are long-lived and polit-
ically challenging to retire (Jakob et al 2020). Trans-
port and building emissions are more diffuse and
spread across many actors; they are linked to urban
form, physical infrastructures and everyday beha-
viour, thus involving non-trivial technological and
social challenges to mitigation (Creutzig et al 2015).
Industry emissions are associated with the produc-
tion of metals, chemicals, cement and other basic
materials demanded by our economies.Many of these
processes are inefficient and offer a large scope for
rapid emissions cuts, although some are difficult to
fully mitigate (Davis et al 2018, Rissman et al 2020).
AFOLU emissions and removals are linked to the
production of food, feed and timber production—a
particularly difficult sector as these are essential ser-
vices, carried out by millions of actors, on a glob-
ally limited area of land with multiple competing
demands (IPCC 2019).
There have been few attempts to describe global
and regional emissions trends and drivers on a con-
sistent and comprehensive sectoral basis. There is
a substantive literature that compiles global emis-
sions inventories for carbon dioxide (CO2) (Grassi
et al 2018, Quéré Le et al 2018, Friedlingstein et al
2019), methane (CH4) (Kirschke et al 2013, Saunois
et al 2020), and nitrous oxide (N2O) emissions
(Janssens-Maenhout et al 2019, Tian et al 2020).
There are also dedicated IPCC chapters and reports
analysing the contributions of each sector, includ-
ing energy systems (Bruckner et al 2014), build-
ings (Lucon et al 2014), transport (Sims et al 2014),
industry (Fischedick et al 2014) and AFOLU (Smith
et al 2014, IPCC 2019). And it is commonplace for
national and regional studies to analyse sectoral emis-
sions trends and drivers, such as for China (Guan
et al 2018), the US (Feng et al 2015), or the EU
(Spencer et al 2017). In this study, we aim to update
and synthesise these literatures, comprehensively and
consistently covering all sources of GHG emissions,
for all world regions and across all sectors, drawing
from expertise in each area to explain key trends and
drivers. The core research questions of this review are
as follows:
(a) What are the recent trends in global, regional and
sectoral greenhouse gas emissions?
(b) What are the driving factors underlying these
trends?
In addressing these questions, we combine sev-
eral elements of analysis. First, we draw from a com-
prehensive GHG emissions dataset to describe recent
global and regional trends in sector emissions. This
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provides the context for an in-depth review of the
main drivers underpinning sector emissions trends.
We further support this review with sector specific
Kaya decompositions, and other relevant descriptive
data. Our aim is to provide a summary of the main
trends and challenges, sector by sector, which collect-
ively shape our prospects for a rapid and deep trans-
ition to avoid dangerous climate change.
2. Methods andmaterials
This article is a literature review supported by several
elements of empirical analysis. Here we briefly sum-
marise our approach to literature identification, data
sources and analysis, with further details provided
in the supplementary materials (available online at
stacks.iop.org/ERL/16/073005/mmedia).
2.1. Literature search and inclusion
This topical review provides a targeted review of
the literature on emission trends and their underly-
ing drivers across different sectors of the economy
(energy systems, industry, buildings, transport and
AFOLU). Due to the broad scope and a potentially
very expansive literature base, we inform and focus
our review in each sector with a supplementary data
analysis on global and regional emissions trends. This
analysis (described in the following section) brings
forward the main and fastest growing sources of
GHG emissions in each sector, as well as the regional
profiles of these emissions. It further identifies on
going trends in key driving forces, elaborated in Kaya
decompositions.
Based on these analyses, teams of sector experts
determined the scope of their review, structured into
common components across sectors. These include
drivers of global and regional demand, and factors
that influence emissions intensity and efficiency. We
rely on the deep sectoral knowledge of our sector
teams for the identification of the relevant literat-
ure. We also conducted targeted keyword searches
on the Web of Science and Google Scholar platforms
to inform our selection of literature. These include,
for example, relevant activity data underlying sector
trends (such as trends in ‘building floor space’ per
capita, ‘motorisation’, or ‘renewable energy deploy-
ment’). This focus on relevant key drivers in our
searches ensures tractability given the scope of our
review, but we search more exhaustively with a struc-
tured keyword query for Kaya literature in particular
(the search string is provided in the supplementary
materials).
2.2. Global and regional GHG emissions trends
We use the EDGAR v5.0 database to track global,
regional and sectoral GHG emissions from 1990
to 2018 (Crippa et al 2019). EDGAR includes CO2
emissions from fossil fuel combustion derived from
International Energy Agency data (IEA 2020c), sup-
plemented with CH4 and N2O emissions from
savannah burning sourced from the Food and Agri-
cultural Organisation of the United Nations (FAO
2019), and CH4 and N2O from forest and peat
fires taken from the Global Fire Emissions Database
(GFED v4.1s; van der Werf et al 2017).
EDGAR does not include land-use change and
management CO2 emissions and removals (here-
after ‘land-use CO2’ emissions). We therefore source
these separately, using the average of three global
bookkeeping models (Hansis et al 2015, Houghton
and Nassikas 2017, Gasser et al 2020) in a con-
vention established by the Global Carbon Project
(Friedlingstein et al 2019). These include CO2 emis-
sions from peat burning and draining from FAO and
GFED.
Land-use CO2 estimates follow the approach
of the global modelling community, which attrib-
utes anthropogenic CO2 fluxes based on underly-
ing drivers, not where they occur (Friedlingstein
et al 2019). In other words, fluxes caused by direct
land-use change and land management processes are
accounted for, while fluxes driven by, e.g. indirect
anthropogenic effects of changes in environmental
conditions on land not subject to modelled manage-
ment activities, are excluded (Grassi et al 2018, Jia
et al 2019). (Note that the latter would be included
in the AFOLU flux under UNFCCC reporting, if they
occurred on what countries define as ‘managed land’
for reporting, which is a larger area of forests than
considered as subject to management by the mod-
els. Thus National Greenhouse gas Inventories sum
to larger CO2 removals (and thus smaller net global
CO2 emissions) than the global models because of the
net effects of CO2-fertilisation, N fertilisation and cli-
mate change on the larger areas of ‘managed forests’
(Grassi et al 2018)).
We use 100 year global warming potentials as
updated for the IPCC 6th Assessment Report (AR6)
to facilitate comparability between the different gases
in this data set (CO2, CH4, N2O and fluorinated
(F-)gases). Emissions are presented as global and
regional totals; the latter using a ten region split
also developed for IPCC AR6. A list of countries
within each region is available in the supplementary
materials.
Consistency in the allocation of emissions and
energy use to sectors is important for our analysis.
We follow the IPCC 5th Assessment Report (AR5) in
allocating emissions sources from the EDGAR data-
base exclusively to five overarching sectors: Energy
Systems, Industry, Buildings, Transport and AFOLU.
Within each sector we construct a second level
categorisation (‘sub-sectors’) comprising groups of
structurally similar emissions sources. An explana-
tion of these categories and the detailed sector alloc-
ation is available as a supplementary data file.
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2.3. Direct versus indirect emissions
Our emissions estimates distinguish between two
accounting methods: scope 1 or ‘direct’ emissions,
comprising the emissions produced by owned or con-
trolled sources; and scope 2, or ‘indirect’ emissions,
where the emissions associated with the generation of
electricity and heat in the energy systems sector are
allocated to sectors where this energy is consumed. A
scope 2 reallocation of indirect emissions is particu-
larly consequential for the buildings and industry sec-
tors, where some consumed energy is produced on-
site (e.g. in gas boilers), but a large fraction is also
sourced upstream from power plants via electricity
consumption.
To allocate emissions from the electricity and heat
sector to final sectors as indirect emissions, we use
estimates provided in the CO2 emissions dataset of
the IEA (2020a). These estimates are based on indi-
vidual electricity and heat specific emission factors,
and assumea fixed efficiency of 90% for heat plants
(in order to calculate the share of emissions associ-
ated with heat versus electricity in combined heat and
power plants). Since the total emissions of the elec-
tricity and heat sector in IEA differs to EDGAR, we
calculate the proportion of indirect emissions in each
final sector in IEA, then multiply these values using
the EDGAR electricity and heat total.
We do not consider ‘consumption-based’ emis-
sions, which comprise all embodied emissions
associated with the consumption of a product or
service. This is relevant for tracking upstream and
downstream emissions related to regional and global
supply chain networks (Hubacek et al 2014, Li et al
2020), but is beyond the limits of our work.
2.4. Decomposition of global and sectoral
emissions drivers
To support our analysis and review of the main driv-
ing forces and regional differences underlying emis-
sions trends, we perform a Kaya decomposition ana-
lysis for each sector (Kaya 1990). Kaya analysis is a
common method applied across the climate mitiga-
tion literature, which expresses emissions (tCO2) as
a function of population (persons), GDP (2010 US$,
PPP) and energy (joules), with the respective terms F,
P, G and E:
F= P(G/P)(E/G)(F/E)
where G/P is GDP per capita, E/G is the energy
intensity of GDP and F/E is the carbon intensity of
energy. To apply the analysis at a sector level, we use
the IEA World Energy Balances (IEA 2020c) to isol-
ate the primary energy supply for the energy sys-
tems sector, and total final energy consumption for
the industry, transport, and buildings sectors. We
then match these sectors with CO2 emissions (F)
sourced from the IEA (2020a). To ensure consistency
in our sector definitions—between the prior emis-
sions trends analysis (which uses EDGAR data) and
this Kaya analysis (IEA data)—we rely on a detailed
mapping of IEA energy sectors to EDGAR emissions
sources, available in the supplementary materials.
The Kaya decomposition for these four sectors is
narrower in scope than our overall estimates of GHG
emissions, as it focuses only on the CO2 emissions
associated with energy use, i.e. fossil fuel combustion.
It does not include GHG emissions from cement,
ceramics, landfill, land-use change and agriculture, as
these are not directly related to energy use, and thus
could not be evaluated in the same decomposition.
Nor do we include indirect emissions in the decom-
position. Finally, since there is no meaningful way
to allocate population and GDP data for sectors, we
simply use regional and global totals in every decom-
position, using population estimates from the United
Nations (UNDESA 2019) and GDP in purchasing-
power parity terms from the IEA (2020a), extended
with growth rates from the IMF (2020) for the most
recent years.
The Kaya decomposition is conceptually straight-
forward in the case of energy systems, industry, build-
ings, and transport sectors. However, it is less appro-
priate for AFOLU, where underlying activities are
indirectly driven by energy use and GDP. Instead,
area of land under different uses and agricultural out-
put are closer proxy drivers of AFOLU emissions.
We therefore substitute the terms for an AFOLU
specific decomposition, as established by Hong et al
(2021), where AFOLU GHG emissions (tCO2eq) is
the function of population (persons), agricultural
output (kcals), and agricultural land area (hectares),
with the respective symbols H, P, A and L:
H= P(A/P)(L/A)(H/L) .
A/P is agricultural output per capita, L/A is the land
required for a unit of agricultural output, and H/L
is GHG emissions per unit of land. In this decom-
position H is composed of agricultural CH4 and N2O
emissions from EDGAR supplemented with land-use
CO2 emissions from the bookkeepingmodels (Hansis
et al 2015, Houghton and Nassikas 2017, Gasser et al
2020). Due to land data constraints, this decomposi-
tionmisses a single year (1990–2017) relative to other
sectors (1990–2018).
2.5. Uncertainties and growth rate calculation
There are different uncertainties associated with his-
torical GHG emissions estimates. These can be traced
to uncertainties in (and a lack of) underlying activ-
ity and inventory data (particularly in non-OECD
countries), the use of average emissions factors across
countries and fuel types, different interpretations of
oxidisation and combustion, and other assumptions
(Andrew 2020).
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Fossil fuel combustion emissions are generally
regarded to have comparatively small uncertainties
due to the sophistication and standardisation of his-
torical energy data reporting. By contrast, uncer-
tainties are much higher for AFOLU CO2 emissions
and all other greenhouse gases. Following IPCC AR5
(Blanco et al 2014) we assume uncertainties of ±8%
for global emissions of CO2 from fossil fuel combus-
tion, ±20% for CH4 emissions and Fgases, ±50%
for AFOLU CO2 emissions, and ±60% for N2O
emissions.
Two particular subsectors are noteworthy for hav-
ing both high emissions and high uncertainties: fugit-
ive CH4 emissions and land-use CO2 emissions.
Regarding the former, recent studies have found
substantial discrepancies between nationally repor-
ted GHG inventories for oil and gas fugitive emis-
sions versus observational evidence of anthropogenic
CH4 emissions (Alvarez et al 2018, Weller et al 2020).
Notably, Hmiel et al (2020) concluded from pre-
industrial ice core 14CH4 measurements that nat-
ural geological sources of methane emissions are a
much smaller fraction of total atmospheric methane
than previously estimated, with a potential under-
estimate of global anthropogenic CH4 emissions of
25%–40%. The likely source is oil and gas infrastruc-
ture leaks, which occur across the supply chain, from
extraction, processing and up to gas distribution and
final use (Christian et al 2016, Alvarez et al 2018,
Weller et al 2020).
Uncertainties around AFOLU CO2 emissions
in the latest Global Carbon Budget are around
46% over 2009–2018, based on the mean and one
standard deviation of three bookkeeping models
(Friedlingstein et al 2019). BLUE emission estim-
ates (Hansis et al 2015) are globally higher than
the Houghton and Nassikas (HN) (2017) model,
in part driven by the explicit representation of
land-use transitions at the sub-grid scale in BLUE
and the preferential allocation of pasture on nat-
ural grassland in HN (Hansis et al 2015). Further,
trends of individual datasets differ over recent years,
e.g. with an upward trend in BLUE vs a down-
ward trend in HN since the 2000s for land-use
CO2 emissions. These different trends are at least
partly attributable to the underlying land-use forcing
(Gasser et al 2020). The third model, OSCAR (Gasser
et al 2020), follows the approximate mean of BLUE
and HN.
We derive the growth rates of emissions trends








where EFF is the emissions value or Kaya factor in a
given year (t).
3. Results and discussion
3.1. All sectors
Global GHG emissions continued to rise between
2010 and 2018, although the rate of emissions growth
has slowed since 2014 (figure 1). GHG emissions
were the highest in human history in 2018, reach-
ing 58 GtCO2eq. The largest share of emissions in
2018 came from the energy systems sector (34%; 20
GtCO2eq), followed by industry (24%; 14 GtCO2eq),
AFOLU (21%; 12 GtCO2eq), transport (14%; 8.3
GtCO2eq) and the operation of buildings (6%; 3.3
Gt CO2eq). These estimates are based on direct emis-
sions produced in each sector. As we discuss below,
the industry and buildings sectors further contributed
to emission growth indirectly, by drawing on electri-
city and heat production in the energy systems sector.
GHG emissions in 2018 were about 11% (5.8
GtCO2eq) higher than GHG emission levels in
2010 (52 GtCO2eq). One third of this increase in
GHG emissions between 2010 and 2018 was from
energy systems (1.9 GtCO2eq), followed by industry
(1.8 GtCO2eq, 30% of the increase), transport (1.2
GtCO2eq, 20%), AFOLU (0.72 GtCO2eq, 12%) and
buildings (0.22 GtCO2eq, 4%).
In terms of regions, East Asia and North Amer-
ica together accounted for 40% of global GHG emis-
sions in 2018, within which emissions are dominated
by China and the United States. The highest abso-
lute increase between 2010 and 2018 was in Eastern
Asia (2.6 GtCO2eq), more than double the growth of
the next highest region, SouthernAsia (1.1GtCO2eq).
Four regions—the Middle East, Africa, Eurasia and
South-East Asia—accounted for the rest of the global
emissions increase with approximately 0.5 GtCO2eq
each. The most rapid relative growth in emissions
since 2010 occurred in Southern Asia at 3.6% per
year, followed by the Middle East (2.6%/yr), East-
ern Asia (2.4%/yr) and Eurasia (1.9%/yr). The only
regionwith a decline in emissions since 2010 has been
Europe (−0.3 GtCO2eq, −0.8%/yr). North Amer-
ica, Latin America, and developed countries in the
Asia Pacific saw onlyminimal growth over this period
(+0.1%/yr,+0.1%/yr and+0.4%/yr, respectively).
Trends by sector differ widely across regions.
Developed countries in Asia Pacific, Europe and
North America tend to have higher shares of emis-
sions from energy systems, industry and transport,
and lower shares from AFOLU. Overall emissions
in these regions are relatively stable, apart from the
energy systems sector in Europe and North Amer-
ica, which have seen gradual reductions since 2010
(−1.8%/yr and −1.5%/yr, respectively). This general
pattern is reversed in the case of Africa, Latin Amer-
ica and South-East Asia. In these regions AFOLU is
the largest emitting sector (specifically: CO2 emis-
sions from deforestation), yet much of the recent
growth comes from the energy systems, industry and
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Figure 1. Global and regional GHG emissions trends for all sectors. Panel (a) shows total global anthropogenic GHG emissions
divided into major sectors. Panel (b) shows regional emission trends in the years 1990, 2000, 2010, and 2018. This figure shows
the direct (scope 1) allocation of emissions to sectors.
transportation sectors. Similarly, fast growing emis-
sions in Eastern and Southern Asia are mainly associ-
ated with the industry, energy systems and transport
sectors, some at rates exceeding 4%/yr.
The largest individual sub-sector contributing to
globalGHGemissions in 2018was electricity andheat
generation at 13.9 GtCO2eq (24%). This subsector
can be reallocated to consuming sectors as indirect
(scope 2) emissions, thus highlighting the importance
of energy demand as a driver of global climate change
(de la Rue du Can et al 2015, Creutzig et al 2016,
2018). From this perspective, the relative importance
of the industry and buildings sectors jump dramatic-
ally, from 25% to 35%, and 6% to 17%, respectively
(figure 2).
The highest emitting subsectors after electricity
and heat are ‘other industry’30, land-use change and
management, road transport, residential buildings,
metals, chemicals, enteric fermentation (i.e. livestock
rearing), non-residential buildings, oil and gas fugit-
ive emissions, and the waste sector. Indirect emis-
sions account for a large proportion of emissions
in some of these sectors, particularly the residen-
tial and non-residential buildings subsectors (more
30This broad category includes the paper and pulp sector, food
and tobacco processing, industrial sources of fluorinated gases, and
other generic industries.
than 50% of emissions), and the other industry,
metals and chemicals subsectors (more than 20%
of emissions). Among the largest sub-sectors, the
fastest growing from 2010 to 2018 have been oil
and gas fugitive emissions (+2.1%), road transport
(+2%), coal mining fugitive emissions (+2%), and
metals (+2%) (figure 3). Some of these emissions
trends, however, are marked by significant uncer-
tainty (see section 2.5).
Our data runs to 2018 and therefore misses
the most recent break in emissions trends resulting
from COVID-19 induced lockdowns in 2020. Sev-
eral studies have observed sharp reductions in global
daily emissions over the course of 2020 (Le Quéré
et al 2020, Lenzen et al 2020, Liu et al 2020c). The
lockdowns impacted emissions in the transport sec-
tor most heavily, particularly aviation, followed by
electricity and industry emissions (Le Quéré et al
2020). Most of these reductions will be temporary,
but COVID-19 may shape the driving forces of sec-
toral emissions in the long run, depending on the
nature of stimulus packages and associated invest-
ments that are rolled out in the wake of the pandemic
(Shan et al 2020).
We now turn our attention to the underlying
factors of emissions growth. For this purpose, we
decomposed the trends of CO2 emissions from fuel
combustion (excluding other GHGs) into several
6
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Figure 2. Direct versus indirect emissions. The stacked bar on the left indicates total global greenhouse gas emissions in 2018, split
by sectors based on direct (scope 1) emissions accounting. The arrows shown next to the electricity and heat sector depict the
reallocation of these emissions to final sectors as indirect (scope 2) emissions. This increases the contribution to global emissions
from the industry and buildings sector (central stacked bar). The stacked bar on the far right indicates the shares of subsectors in
global emissions when indirect emissions are included.
Figure 3. Total global emissions by highest emitting subsectors. Only 15 subsectors out of 21 are shown. Indirect emissions from
electricity and heat production are reallocated to subsectors as indicated. Growth rates in the left-hand panel are average annual
rates across 2010–2018.
driving factors, startingwith an overview of all sectors
in figure 4 and then investigating individual sectors in
more detail in the following sections.
In general, economic growth (measured as GDP)
and its main components, affluence (GDP per capita)
and population growth, all remained the strongest
drivers ofGHGemissions in the last decade, following
the long-term trend (Burke et al 2015, Yao et al
2015, Malik et al 2016, Sanchez and Stern 2016,
Stern et al 2017, Chang et al 2019, Dong et al 2019,
2020, Liobikiene and Butkus 2019, Liu et al 2019,
Mardani et al 2019, Pan et al 2019, Parker and
Bhatti 2020). Globally, affluence remained by far the
strongest upward driver, increasing almost in tandem
7
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Figure 4. Kaya decomposition of CO2 emissions drivers (total of all sectors). The indicated growth rates are averaged across the
years 2010–2018. Note that the energy term by itself is not part of the decomposition, but is depicted here for comparison with
the Kaya factors. This figure is for fossil fuel CO2 emissions only, in order to ensure compatibility with underlying energy data.
with energy consumption andCO2 emissions upuntil
2015, after which some modest relative decoupling
occurred (figure 4).
The main counteracting, yet insufficient, factor
that led to emissions reductions was decreased energy
use per unit of GDP in almost all regions (−2.1%
globally). These reductions in energy intensity are a
result of technological innovation, regulation, struc-
tural change and increased economic efficiency (Yao
et al 2015, Sanchez and Stern 2016, Chang et al 2019,
Dong et al 2019, Liu et al 2019, Marin and Mazzanti
2019, Mohmmed et al 2019, Stern 2019, Wang et al
2019b, Goldemberg 2020). The decades-long trend
that efficiency gains were outpaced by an increase in
worldwide affluence continued unabated in the last
10 years (Haberl et al 2020, Wiedenhofer et al 2020,
Wiedmann et al 2020). Therefore, GHG emissions
only show relative, not absolute, decoupling from
GDP at the global level (Deutch 2017, Wood et al
2018). In addition, the emissions-reducing effects of
energy efficiency improvements are diminished by
the energy rebound effect, which has been found in
several studies to significantly offset some energy sav-
ings (Rausch and Schwerin 2018, Bruns et al 2019,
Stern 2020).
A significant decarbonisation of the energy sys-
tem was only noticeable in North America, Europe
and Eurasia. Globally, the amount of CO2 per unit of
energy used has remained practically unchanged over
the last three decades, as the rapid growth of renew-
able energy in some regions has been matched by
new fossil plants in others (Chang et al 2019, Jackson
et al 2019, Peters et al 2020). Population growth has
also remained a persistent upward driver in almost all
regions (figure 4).
Global economic growth as the main driver
of GHG emissions plays out particularly strong in
China and India (Liu et al 2019, Ortega-Ruiz et al
2020, Yang et al 2020, Zheng et al 2020, Wang et al
2020b), although both countries show signs of relative
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Figure 5. Global and regional GHG emissions trends for the energy sector. Panel (a) shows total global energy systems GHG
emissions divided into major subsectors. Panel (b) shows regional emission trends in the years 1990, 2000, 2010, and 2018. This
figure shows the direct (scope 1) allocation of emissions to sectors. Note that emissions from the electricity and heat subsector are
allocated as indirect (scope 2) emissions to the buildings, industry and transport sectors in the following sections (thus double
counting between these respective sector figures).
decoupling because of structural changes (Marin and
Mazzanti 2019). A change in China’s production
structure and consumption patterns (i.e. the type of
goods and services consumed) have become the main
moderating factors of emissions after 2010, while eco-
nomic growth, consumption levels and investment
remain the dominating factors driving up emissions
(Jiborn et al 2020, Zheng et al 2020). In India low
emission efficiency and expansion of production and
trade caused the growth of emissions (Wang and
Zhou 2020).
There are pronounced differences both in recent
changes in the absolute levels and drivers of GHG
emissions when differentiating countries by income
levels (Dong et al 2019) or by regions (Chang
et al 2019). In high-income countries, significant
improvements in energy intensity led to declin-
ing CO2 emissions between 2010 and 2015, despite
increasing income levels and populations (Dong et al
2019). In upper middle-income and lower middle-
income countries, rising income more than offset
any energy structural or intensity gains, leading to
increased emissions. And CO2 emissions increased
the most in low-income countries, due to signific-
ant increases in carbon intensities, income levels and
population (Dong et al 2019). Importantly, some of
these trends are partially related to shifts in global
supply chains, where some production emissions
could also be allocated to final consumers under a
so-called consumption-based perspective, mostly in
high- and middle-income countries (an issue we do
not address in this article) (Peters et al 2011).
3.2. Energy systems
Overall, energy systems make up the largest share of
the five sectors, with 34% of total global GHG emis-
sions (although electricity and heat emissions can also
be reallocated to demand sectors, particularly build-
ings and industry). GHG emissions in the energy sec-
tor grew to 20 GtCO2eq in 2018, with the strongest
growth occurring between 2000 and 2010 (2.9% per
year) and slowing down to 1.3% growth per year
between 2010 and 2018 (figure 5).
Most energy systems emissions are associated
with the power sector, i.e. coal, gas and other plants
that produce electricity and heat. These accounted
for 71% of the total (14 GtCO2eq) in 2018. Fugitive
emissions fromoil and gas production (2.5 GtCO2eq)
and coal mining (1.3 GtCO2eq) account for the
second and third largest contributions. The overall
growth of the energy systems sector between 2010 and
2018 (+1.9 GtCO2eq) can be mainly attributed to
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Figure 6. Kaya decomposition of CO2 emissions drivers for the energy systems sector. The indicated growth rates are averaged
across the years 2010–2018. Note that the energy term by itself is not part of the decomposition, but is depicted here for
comparison with the Kaya factors. This figure is for fossil fuel CO2 emissions only, in order to ensure compatibility with
underlying energy data.
electricity and heat (+1.2 GtCO2eq, 62% of growth),
followed by oil and gas (+0.37 GtCO2eq, 19% of
growth) and coal mining (0.18 GtCO2eq, 9% of
growth) fugitive emissions.
On a regional basis, East Asia stands out as the
largest contributor to energy systems emissions in
2018 (6.3 GtCO2eq) and with the largest absolute
growth from 2010 to 2018 (+1.2 GtCO2eq), aver-
aging 2.6% per year. North America (2.8 GtCO2eq)
is the second highest emitter, followed by Eurasia
(1.8 GtCO2eq) and Europe (1.7 GtCO2eq). Of these,
only Eurasia has grown in emissions (+0.1 GtCO2eq,
0.6%/yr), while Europe and North America have seen
slight declines over the last decade (−1.8%/yr and
−1.5%/yr, respectively, leading to −0.27 GtCO2eq
and −0.35 GtCO2eq reductions). Southern Asia,
South-East Asia and the Middle East are not amongst
the largest absolute contributors, but they exhibit
the largest annual growth rates of 4.9%, 4.3% and
3.3% respectively between 2010 and 2018. Africa,
Asia-Pacific Developed and Latin America have seen
only modest growth at or below 1% per year. Elec-
tricity and heat is currently the dominant source
of GHG emissions from energy systems in various
regions of the world, representing more than 50%
of emissions in most and reaching as high as 80%
in Southern Asia and East Asia. However, in some
countries and regions fugitive emissions from oil and
gas and coal production figure more prominently,
such as in the Middle East (39% of energy systems
emissions), Africa (31%), Latin America (25%) and
Eurasia (24%).
At the global level, growth in CO2 emissions
from energy systems have closely tracked rising GDP
per capita (figure 6), affirming the substantial lit-
erature describing the mutual relationships between
energy, electricity demand, exergy and economic
growth (Khanna and Rao 2009, Stern 2011, Haberl
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Figure 7. The fossil share of electricity and heat production by region in selected years. Regional shares of fossil fuels in the
electricity and heat sector are weighted by total electricity and heat output. Data from the IEAWorld Energy Balances (IEA 2020c).
et al 2020, Wiedenhofer et al 2020). This relationship
has played out strongly in developing regions, partic-
ularly in Asia, where a massive scale up of energy sup-
ply has accompanied economic growth—with aver-
age annual increases of energy demand between 3.5%
and 4.8% in the past decade (figure 6). (We cover
these drivers of electricity demand in the industry
and building sectors). The key downward driver has
been declining energy intensities in almost all regions,
associated with ongoing improvements in genera-
tion and transmission efficiency. Carbon intensities
of energy supply have had a neutral effect, remain-
ing globally stable since the 1990s, albeit with regional
variations.
On the energy production side, almost all regions
have seen steady decreases in energy intensities, at a
global average of−2.1% per year since 2010, and at a
similar steady pace in most individual regions albeit
at varying rates. Technology benchmarking studies
show that power generation efficiencies vary widely
between (and also within) regions—generally higher
in Europe, Japan and the United states, and lower
in Russia, China, India and Australia (Maruyama
and Eckelman 2009, Oda et al 2012). In the case
of coal these differences are mainly driven by fuel
qualities (e.g. lignite vs black coal) and the level of
plant thermal efficiency (subcritical vs supercritical
vs combined heat and power plants). Since newly
deployed plants have higher efficiencies and older
inefficient plants are steadily retired or retrofitted—
particularly following concerted policy efforts, as is
the case in China—the electricity output for a given
quantity of fuel tends to improve over time, hence
leading to an aggregate energy intensity improvement
(Li et al 2020).
Improvements in carbon intensity can be decom-
posed into two distinct drivers: fossil intensity (the
emissions intensity of fossil fuels) and fossil share (the
substitution of fossil fuels by renewables) (Peters et al
2017). In the United States fossil intensity improve-
ments have had a larger overall effect since 2006,
due to a widespread coal to gas switch driven by
low gas prices following a shale gas boom, and fed-
eral tax credit incentives (Peters et al 2017, 2020,
Feng 2019, Mohlin et al 2019). Nonetheless, the over-
all share of fossil fuels in electricity production has
also recently declined in North America (from 66%
in 2010 to 59% in 2018; figure 7), with renewable
capacity expanding rapidly in Texas, California and
across the Midwest (Mohlin et al 2019). Declining
fossil intensities associated with a coal to gas switch
also drove down emissions in Europe in the early
2000s (Rodrigues et al 2020). But since 2007, Europe’s
carbon intensity improvements have instead been
driven the steady expansion of renewables in the
share of electricity generation (Peters et al 2017, 2020,
Le Quéré et al 2019, Rodrigues et al 2020), with a
fossil share decrease of 57% in 2010 to 47% in 2018
(figure 7). Some studies attribute these effects to cli-
mate policies, such as the carbon floor price in the
UK, the EU emissions trading scheme, and gener-
ous renewable energy subsidies across the continent
(Dyrstad et al 2019, Wang et al 2020a). Asia-Pacific
Developed stands out in contrast to other developed
regions, with a dramatic increase of regional carbon
intensity and fossil share since 2010. This was due
to the ramp up of coal and gas capacity in Japan
following the Fukushima nuclear accident (Khare-
cha and Sato 2019). Generally, the use of natural
gas for electricity production is growing strongly in
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most countries and gas has contributed to the largest
increase in global fossil CO2 emissions in recent years
(Jackson et al 2019, Peters et al 2020).
Steady or increasing carbon intensities can be
observed in most other regions, indicating fur-
ther deepening of fossil fuel based energy systems
worldwide (figure 6). A major driver of these trends
is the global ‘renaissance of coal’ that started in
the 1990s, primarily driven by a huge increase of
coal generation capacity in China (Steckel et al 2015,
Jiang and Guan 2016). The growth of coal emis-
sions slowed after 2010, primarily due to a slow-
down of economic growth and fewer coal capacity
additions in China, and even declined between 2011
and 2018 (Friedlingstein et al 2019, Peters et al 2020).
Discussions of a global ‘peak coal’, however, may
be premature, as further growth was observed in
2019 (Friedlingstein et al 2019, Peters et al 2020). In
addition, the renaissance has not been limited to
China alone, with large ongoing and planned capacity
increases in India, Turkey, Indonesia, Vietnam, South
Africa and others (UNEP 2017, Edenhofer et al 2018,
Steckel et al 2020).
The declining competitiveness of coal-based gen-
eration relative to alternatives, particularly solar PV,
as well as its short-term health and environmental
impacts, begs the question why many countries have
continued to invest in coal capacity (Creutzig et al
2017, Lelieveld et al 2019, Rauner et al 2020). His-
torically, coal powered generation has been perceived
as a relatively low-cost, stable, and technologically
accessible option to expand grid electricity and meet
growing consumption demands. As private and pub-
lic utilities have invested in these technologies they
locked-in technological pathways and shaped institu-
tional environments (e.g. supportive financial, legal
and political structures) that increase the costs of
transitioning to alternatives. Recent studies show that
incumbent energy utilities have only in rare excep-
tions transitioned a sizable share of their portfolios
towards renewable energy (Alova 2020, Green et al
2020). It is rather new actors and interests driving
these investments, often against considerable opposi-
tion and backlash from interest groups, particularly
if implemented policies do succeed in scaling up
renewable technologies (Moe 2015, Stokes and Breetz
2018). Fossil-based development pathways may also
be chosen to meet the narrow goals of national and
international interest groups, such as rent extraction
or energy independence, and are shaped by issues
such as lobbying, political ideology, and corruption
(Dorband et al 2020, Jakob et al 2020, Lamb and
Minx 2020, Roy and Schaffartzik 2021).
Overall, global energy system emissions growth
has slowed in recent years, due to a reduction of
fossil capacity additions in China, a structural shift
to gas and renewables in the United States (Feng et al
2016), and the increasing penetration of renewables
in Europe. The worldwide share of fossil fuels shrank
slowly, down from 73% in 1990 to 68% in 2018. Des-
pite this, global oil and gas use is still growing (Jackson
et al 2019). The switch of coal to gas brings the risk
of increased CH4 emissions from fugitive sources, as
well as large cumulative emissions over the lifetime of
the new plants that may erase early carbon intensity
reductions (Shearer et al 2020). The focus of decar-
bonisation efforts in the energy systems sector needs
to be on rapidly shifting to zero-carbon sources and
actively phasing out all fossil fuels, rather than relying
on the short-lived effects of fuel switching (Jackson
et al 2019, Peters et al 2020).
3.3. Industry
Direct and indirect GHG emissions in the industry
sector steadily increased to 20.1 GtCO2eq in 2018.
Based on direct emissions alone, the industry sec-
tor is the second largest contributor to total emis-
sions in 2018 (25%), following energy systems. When
indirect emissions from electricity and heat pro-
duction are included, industry becomes the single
highest emitting sector (35%). In addition, industry
has a steadily increasing share of all direct emis-
sions since 1990 and faces non-trivial technolo-
gical bottlenecks to mitigation, particularly in steel
and cement process emissions, making it a key
sector that will shape global mitigation prospects
going forward (Davis et al 2018, Crippa et al 2019,
Rissman et al 2020).
Apart from indirect emissions from the power
sector (5.9 GtCO2eq, 30% of total), industry emis-
sions in 2018 are largely driven by ‘other industry’
(4.5 GtCO2eq, 23% of total). ‘Other industry’ com-
prises a multitude of emissions sources associated
with the manufacture of pulp and paper, food and
tobacco, glass and ceramics, and other generic man-
ufacturing. It also includes the production and use of
fluorinated gases for solvents, refrigerants and elec-
trical equipment. Three further subsectors account
for basic materials production: metals (3.1 GtCO2eq,
15% of total), chemicals (2.8 GtCO2eq, 14% of total)
and cement (1.6 GtCO2eq, 8% of total). Finally, waste
(2.1 GtCO2eq, 11% of total) includes the emissions
from incineration and waste disposal on land, as well
as industrial, domestic and commercial wastewater
processing.
The main period of industry emissions growth
occurred between 2000 and 2010, which saw a total
increase of 5.5 GtCO2eq (+3.8%/yr). Growth has
subsequently slowed down to 1.6% per year since
then, with an approximately proportionate contribu-
tion from each subsector. At a regional level, Eastern
Asia stands out as the main source of global industry
emissions (8.7 GtCO2eq in 2018, 43% of total), as
well as the primary driver of growth since 2010 (+1.3
GtCO2eq, 2%/yr). At the same time, industry emis-
sions remained high in Europe (2 GtCO2eq in 2018),
but have slowly declined at a rate of−0.7%/yr. North
America, Asia-Pacific Developed and Latin America
12
Environ. Res. Lett. 16 (2021) 073005 W F Lamb et al
Figure 8. Global and regional GHG emissions trends for the industry sector. Panel (a) shows total global industry GHG emissions
divided into major subsectors. Panel (b) shows regional emission trends in the years 1990, 2000, 2010, and 2018. Indirect
emissions from the electricity and heat subsector are shown here in grey.
have had stable industry emissions since 2010 (at
1.9, 0.8 and 1.1 GtCO2eq each). In all other regions
they are growing—most rapidly in Southern Asia
(+4.3%/yr to 1.8 GtCO2eq in 2018), South-East Asia
(+3.4%/yr to 0.9 GtCO2eq) and Eurasia (+2.5%/yr
to 1.3 GtCO2eq).
Regions differ somewhat in their composition of
different subsectors, with waste and cement featur-
ing more heavily in developing regions like Africa,
Southern Asia and Latin America, while chemic-
als and other industry play a larger role in Europe
and North America. Emissions from metal produc-
tion take place primarily in East Asia (1.8 GtCO2eq),
followed by Southern Asia (0.33 GtCO2eq), Eurasia
(0.28 GtCO2eq) and Europe (0.22 GtCO2eq).
The main global driver of industry emissions has
been the massive rise in demand for basic materials,
construction minerals and manufactured products.
These are in turn driven by rising affluence and
consumption, as well as an increase in urban pop-
ulations and associated infrastructure development
(Krausmann et al 2017, 2018). Similar to the energy
sector, the industry sector generates products that are
indirectly used in final sectors—namely the mater-
ials that make up the manufactured capital of the
physical economy, such as cement, chemicals, steel,
aluminium, wood, paper, plastics, lubricants, fertil-
isers, and so on. These materials are used to build and
maintain stocks of manufactured capital, including
buildings, roads, vehicles, electronics, and machinery
(also known as ‘material stocks’; Krausmann et al
2017). Material stocks, which will remain in use
over decadal time periods, reached 928 Gt in 2014,
with a growth of 3.9% per year since 2010 and a
26-fold increase since 1900 (Wiedenhofer et al 2019).
Alone, their production and use accounted for 11
GtCO2eq of global emissions in 2011, according to
Hertwich (2021).
There is strong evidence that the growth of con-
crete, steel and other construction material use is
tightly coupled to economic growth, urbanisation,
and associated infrastructure development (Pauliuk
et al 2013, Cao et al 2017, Krausmann et al 2017,
Plank et al 2018, Haberl et al 2020). Per-capita stocks
of cement and steel show a typical pattern of
rapid take-off as countries urbanise and industrial-
ise, before slowing down to low growth at high levels
of GDP. Selected wealthy countries even seem to sta-
bilise at high per-capita levels of stocks, although it
is unclear if these stabilisations persist and if they
result in significant absolute reductions of mater-
ial use (Liu et al 2013, Pauliuk et al 2013, Fishman
et al 2016, Cao et al 2017). Hence, in countries that
are recently industrialising and urbanising—i.e. East-
ern, Southern and South-Eastern Asia—we observe a
particularly strong increase of emissions from these
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subsectors (figure 8) and a strong overall relationship
between GDP growth and industrial CO2 emissions
(figure 9).
Once buildings, roads, ports, vehicles and other
physical stocks have been constructed, a continu-
ous throughput of material flows is still required
to maintain, renovate, replace and operate them
(Wiedenhofer et al 2015, Krausmann et al 2017).
Material consumption in wealthier countries there-
fore has shown only limited rates of decrease, even
though their large existing and only slowly growing
stocks open up (as yet unexploited) opportunities for
prolonging lifetimes and improving end of life recyc-
ling, so as to achieve absolute reductions in extrac-
tion activities (Krausmann et al 2017, Zink and Geyer
2017). For a given level of economic development,
material stock levels and associated material use also
varies due a variety of contextual factors, such as
differences in prevailing construction methods and
building codes (e.g. steel vs timber framing), patterns
of urbanisation and infrastructure development (e.g.
compact cities vs sprawl), trends in dwelling space
and cars per capita, and the overall lifetimes of build-
ings and infrastructure (Lin et al 2016, Hertwich et al
2019, Lanau et al 2019).
As with the AFOLU sector, industrial emis-
sions are strongly linked to international trade.
Materials, especially metals, chemicals, plastics and
wood products, are routinely transported between
different stages of extraction, refining and pro-
duction along global supply chains (Schaffartzik
et al 2016, Plank et al 2018). Owing to a series
of socio-economic conditions including low priced
labour, state-led industrial policy and agglomera-
tion effects, China currently dominates global indus-
trial production, particularly in the manufacture of
steel and other basic materials (Reck et al 2010,
Wang et al 2019a). The global shift of energy-
intensive industries away from historical centres in
the United States and Europe to developing regions
explains, to some extent, reductions of industry
GHG emissions in the former—even though they
continue to consume manufactured products via
trade.
On the production side, improvements in the
energy efficiency of material extraction, processing
and manufacturing have reduced industrial energy
use per unit of output (Wang et al 2019a; figure 9).
These measures, alongside improved material substi-
tution, light-weight designs, extended product and
servicing lifetimes, improved service efficiency and
increased reuse and recycling could enable substan-
tial emissions reductions in the future (Hertwich et al
2019). Switching to lower or zero carbon feedstocks
and power further leads to industry sector decarbon-
isation. Indeed, figure 9 shows that the ratio of indus-
trial energy use to GDP has steadily declined since
2010 in all regions. Absent these improvements in
energy intensity, growth of population and GDP per
capita would have driven industrial CO2 emissions
to rise by more than 100% by 2017 compared with
1990s, instead of 56%. Nonetheless, many studies
point to deep regional differences in efficiency levels
and large globally unexploited potentials to improve
industrial energy efficiency by adopting best avail-
able technologies and practices for metal, cement and
chemical production (Gutowski et al 2013, Schulze
et al 2016, Gonzalez Hernandez et al 2018, Talaei et al
2018). Yet, decarbonising process emissions by tech-
nological improvements alone is unlikely to outweigh
growing demand, calling for additional demand-
side mitigation options to curb emissions from the
industry sector (Creutzig et al 2016).
Overall, demand for services driven by global
affluence and population growth have led to an
escalation of material use and associated industry
GHG emissions. Recent growth has been driven by
emerging economies, but also high-income coun-
tries where direct and indirect consumption remains
high. The growing complexity of international supply
chains makes governance hard and problem-shifting
likely. Historically, energy efficiency provided the
largest mitigation wedge, but still failed to prevent
GHG emissions from increasing. Furthermore, effi-
ciency potentials will decrease in the coming dec-
ades as technological options are exhausted. This puts
increasing focus on historically weak drivers of decar-
bonisation, such as demand management in end-
use sectors (i.e. more efficient delivery of services),
material efficiency (product lightweighting, longer
lifetimes, use of secondary materials), fuel switching
and electrification, and the decarbonisation of power
and feedstocks (IRP 2020).
3.4. Buildings
Global GHG emissions from the buildings sector
reached 9.8 GtCO2eq in 2018, of which 66% (6.5
GtCO2eq) were upstream emissions from power
generation and commercial heat (figure 10). The
remaining 34% (3.4 GtCO2eq) of emissions were dir-
ectly produced in buildings, for instance by gas and
coal boilers, and cooking and lighting devices that
burn kerosene, biomass and other fuels. Residen-
tial buildings accounted for the majority of this sec-
tor’s emissions (64%, 6.3 GtCO2eq, including both
direct and indirect emissions), followed by non-
residential buildings (35%, 3.5 GtCO2eq). Some non-
CO2 sources (CH4 andN2O) also contribute to build-
ing emissions, but these are almost negligible (0.03
GtCO2eq) compared to other subsectors.
The buildings sector accounts for almost 6% of
all direct GHG emissions and 17% when indirect
‘scope 2’ emissions are included. Yet further emis-
sions components could also be attributed to this
sector under alternative accounting schemes, such
as consumption-based emissions footprints. Embod-
ied GHG emissions associated with building mater-
ials and components, as well as the construction,
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Figure 9. Kaya decomposition of CO2 emissions drivers for the industry sector (direct emissions only). The indicated growth rates
are averaged across the years 2010–2018. Note that the energy term by itself is not part of the decomposition, but is depicted here
for comparison with the Kaya factors. This figure is for fossil fuel CO2 emissions only (indirect CO2 emissions and process-related
and waste emissions are excluded) in order to ensure compatibility with underlying energy data.
assembly and maintenance of buildings, make up
an estimated additional 11% of global energy and
process-related CO2 emissions (Ürge-Vorsatz et al
2020). Adding these to the building sector would
further increase emissions by approximately 2.21
GtCO2eq in 2018 (IEA 2020d).
The buildings sector contributed 0.7 GtCO2eq
to global emissions growth between 2010 and 2018,
an increase of 0.9% per year, which was relatively
lower than prior decades where growth rates aver-
aged between 1.7%/yr and 2.1%/yr (figure 10). A
more than proportional amount of growth came
from the residential (direct and indirect) subsector
(+0.5 GtCO2eq, 76% of growth), compared to non-
residential buildings.
The developed regions of North America, Europe,
and Asia-Pacific Developed together accounted for
41% (4 GtCO2eq) of global building emissions in
2018. In all three regions emissions declined over the
period 2010–2018, at rates of −2.2%/yr, −2.5%/yr
and −0.4%/yr, respectively. In the case of North
America, almost all of the reduction (99%) was from
indirect emissions (i.e. the energy systems sector);
while in Europe at least one-third (35%) also came
from decarbonisation in direct residential building
emissions.
The regions of the global South and Eurasia
together accounted for 59% (5.9 GtCO2eq) of global
buildings emissions in 2018. Starting from a much
lower base, buildings emissions increased signific-
antly in these regions between 2010 and 2018, at rates
of 4.9%/yr in Eastern Asia, 4.8%/yr in Southern Asia,
4.3%/yr South-East Asia, 3.1%/yr in Africa, 1.7%/yr
in the Middle East, 1.2%/yr in Latin America and
0.5%/yr in Eurasia. Indirect emissions tended to grow
faster than direct emissions, accounting for 80% of
growth in Eastern Asia, 75% in Southern Asia and
92% SE Asia. This again underlines the close link
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Figure 10. Global and regional GHG emissions trends for the buildings sector. Panel (a) shows total global industry GHG
emissions divided into major subsectors. Panel (b) shows regional emission trends in the years 1990, 2000, 2010, and 2018.
Indirect emissions from the electricity and heat subsector are shown here in grey.
between the buildings sector and energy systems—
which over the past decades has tended towards the
expansion of fossil-based electricity generation in
these regions (section 3.2).
Population and GDP per capita growth are broad
drivers of building emissions trends (figure 11),
which manifest more specifically in a growing
demand for building stock, floor space per capita,
and building energy services as countries develop
and urbanise (Ürge-Vorsatz et al 2015). At the same
time, declines in carbon and energy intensities can be
observed both globally and regionally over the past
decades (figure 11), hinting at the impact of steadily
improving efficiencies and shifts in the composition
of fuels used in buildings (Ürge-Vorsatz et al 2020).
Changes in the upstream power sector also figure
strongly as drivers of indirect building emissions (but
are not included in figure 11).
The global stock of residential andnon-residential
buildings has been steadily growing over the past dec-
ades, driving a huge demand for building energy use
and construction materials (Deetman et al 2020).
Global building stock was estimated at almost
200 billion m2 of floor space in 2018, more than
double of what it was in 1990 (IEA 2020d). China
currently dominates total new additions to build-
ing stock, with urban residential buildings almost
tripling since 1990 (Huo et al 2019, Marinova et al
2020, IEA 2020d). The same occurred in Southern
Asia, South-East Asia and developing pacific while it
has doubled in the developed world, Eurasia, Latin
America and Caribbean as well as Africa and the
Middle East (IEA 2020d).
As countries increase in wealth, developers
tend to construct larger properties and more floor
space is required to service growing demand in the
retail, office and hotel sectors (Daioglou et al 2012,
Deetman et al 2020). At the same time, patterns of
urbanisation and sprawl further shape the density
and overall scale of a country’s building stock. In the
United States, the stock of floor space in single and
multi-family homes has continuously grown over the
21st century, increasing tenfold between 1890 and
2010 (Moura et al 2015).
Beyond population and wealth, demographic and
social factors drive a cross-national trend of increas-
ing floor space per capita. As populations age and
decrease in fertility, and as individuals seek greater
privacy and autonomy, households decline in size
(Ellsworth-Krebs 2020). At the same time, a lack of
1–2 bed dwellings and the tendency for developers
to construct larger family-sized properties may lead
to over occupancy (Huebner and Shipworth 2017).
Together these factors lead to increased floor space
per capita, even as populations stabilise (figure 12).
Overall, there remains a stark but converging divide in
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Figure 11. Kaya decomposition of CO2 emissions drivers for the buildings sector (direct emissions only). The indicated growth
rates are averaged across the years 2010–2018. Note that the energy term by itself is not part of the decomposition, but is depicted
here for comparison with the Kaya factors. This figure is for fossil fuel CO2 emissions only (indirect CO2 emissions are excluded)
in order to ensure compatibility with underlying energy data.
global residential floor space, driven by differences in
household and dwelling size—from an upper range of
40–60m2 per person inWestern European and North
American countries, to approximately 32m2 in China
and 20m2 inMexico (Nie and Kemp 2014; figure 12).
Increasing floor space per capita is a key driver for
building sector emissions, because building charac-
teristics such as size and type, rather than occupant
behaviour, tend to explain the majority of energy use
within dwellings (Guerra Santin et al 2009, Huebner
and Shipworth 2017). Smaller household sizes res-
ult in increased per-capita appliance and equipment
ownership (i.e. fewer people share appliances such as
fridges and cookers), while larger homes increase the
surface area to be illuminated andmaintained at com-
fortable temperatures (Ürge-Vorsatz et al 2015).
Energy activity levels further drive regional
differences. In Eurasia, Europe and North Amer-
ica, thermal demands for space heating dominate
building energy use, at 66%, 62% and 48% of res-
idential energy demand, respectively (IEA 2020d).
In contrast, cooking has a much higher share of
building energy use in regions of the Global South,
including China (Cao et al 2016, Serrano et al 2017).
And despite temperatures being on average warmer
in the Global South, electricity use for cooling is a
more prominent factor in the Global North (Waite
et al 2017). This situation is changing, however, as
rapid income growth and demographic changes in
the global South enable households to heat and cool
their homes (Ürge-Vorsatz et al 2015, 2020). Cool-
ing energy demand represented 8% out of total res-
idential energy demand in North America and the
Middle East in 2018 (IEA 2020d). It was 3%–4%
in Eastern Asia, Latin America and the rest of Asia
(growing from less than 1% in 2010) and remained
below 1% in Europe, Eurasia and Africa in 2018
(IEA 2020d). Annual variations in temperatures and
17
Environ. Res. Lett. 16 (2021) 073005 W F Lamb et al
Figure 12. Residential floor space per capita versus income. Data from the IEA Energy Efficiency Indicators database (IEA 2020d).
All countries trend from the left (2000) to the right (2017).
extreme weather are also important drivers of overall
demand (Idahosa et al 2017, Eggimann et al 2020).
Energy demand for small and connected devices
and appliances is one of the emerging trends in resid-
ential buildings. The highest shares of energy demand
for small and connected devices were observed in
developed Asia-Pacific, with 24% out of total energy
demand in residential buildings, followed by 15% in
North America, and 13% in Middle East countries
(IEA 2020d).
Steady improvements in building energy intens-
ities across regions can be attributed to policies and
baseline improvements in building fabrics, appli-
ance efficiencies, and fuel shifts. Many countries
have adopted a mix of relevant policies, such as
energy labelling, building energy codes and mandat-
ory energy performance requirements (Nie andKemp
2014, Nejat et al 2015). Efforts towards buildings
refurbishments and retrofits have also been pursued
in several nations, especially for historical buildings
in Europe, but evidence suggests that the recent rates
of retrofits have not made a significant dent on emis-
sions (Corrado and Ballarini 2016, Kerr and Winskel
2020). Green building retrofit policies in China too
have been relatively ineffective to date (Liu et al 2020a,
2020b). Still, one major global factor driving down
energy intensities has been the global transition from
inefficient coal and biomass use in buildings for heat-
ing and cooking, towards natural gas and electricity,
in part led by concerted policy action in Asian coun-
tries (Ürge-Vorsatz et al 2015, Kerimray et al 2017,
Thoday et al 2018).
Overall, emissions from the building sector are
expected to continue rising, especially in much of
the Global South as housing gaps are filled and
demand for floor area increases. As developing coun-
tries construct new buildings, there is much poten-
tial to reduce and use less carbon-intensive building
materials, and to adopt building designs and stand-
ards that lower life cycle buildings energy use and
allow for passive comfort. A significant shift from the
use of solid heating and cooking fuels to gas and elec-
tricity in recent years is a trend that will continue and
help reduce emissions. However, increasing appliance
penetration in regions just gaining access to electri-
city will increase electricity related emissions from
the building sector, unless accompanied by improved
standards, labelling, and the decarbonisation of the
electricity sector. Within the Global North, signific-
ant untapped potential for increasing heating, build-
ing fabric and material efficiency exists, as do behavi-
oural shifts towards low-carbon lifestyles.
3.5. Transport
Global transport GHG emissions reached 8.5
GtCO2eq in 2018 and accounted for 14% of all dir-
ect and indirect emissions. Road transport passenger
and freight emissions represent by far the largest com-
ponent and source of this growth (6.1 GtCO2eq, 73%
of total sector emissions), followed by international
shipping (0.7 GtCO2eq, 8%) and international avi-
ation (0.6 GtCO2eq, 7%). National plus international
shipping and aviation emissions together account for
1.8 GtCO2eq or 21% of the sector total. Emissions
from rail, indirect N2O emissions, and indirect CO2
emissions from electricity and heat (e.g. from the
electrification of rail and bus transport) are relatively
small, totalling 0.5 GtCO2eq or 6% of the current
transport total.
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Figure 13. Global and regional GHG emissions trends for the transport sector. Panel (b) shows emissions at the years 1990, 2000,
2010, and 2018. Indirect emissions from electricity and heat consumed in transport are shown here, but are not added to the
transport sector totals in figure 1 (total emissions for all sectors). International aviation and shipping is included in panel
(a), but excluded from panel (b).
Since 1990, global transport emissions have
grown at a constant rate of about 2% per year.
The road subsector accounted for most growth
since 2010 (+0.9 GtCO2eq, at 1.9% per year), but
inland shipping, domestic aviation and international
aviation were the fastest growing subsectors at
+3.2%/yr, +2.8%/yr and +2.7%/yr, respectively.
North America, Europe and Eastern Asia stand out
as the main regional contributors to global transport
emissions and together account for 60% of the total.
Latin America (in 4th place) is also notable for its
high transport emissions, since in all other sectors
apart from AFOLU it tends to be one of the lowest
regional contributors.
Three regions managed to hold transport emis-
sions relatively stable since 2010—Asia Pacific
Developed (+0%/yr), Europe (+0.4%/yr) and
Eurasia (+0.4%/yr)—but all others continued to
grow. Fastest growth since 2010 occurred in East-
ern Asia (+5.6%/yr, +0.4 GtCO2eq), Southern
Asia (+4.9%/yr, +0.1 GtCO2eq), South-East Asia
(+4.5%/yr, +0.1 GtCO2eq) and Africa (+3.3%/yr,
+0.08GtCO2eq). The proportion of total final energy
used in transport (28%) and its fast expansion over
time weighs heavily on climate mitigation efforts as
92% of transport energy comes from oil based-fuels
(IEA 2020c). These trends situate transport as one
of the most challenging sectors for climate change
mitigation—evenwealthier countries have so far been
unable to realise significant emissions reductions in
the sector.
More so than any other sector, transport energy
use has closely tracked GDP per capita growth
(figure 14). Transport facilitates the movement of
people and goods, enabling access to essential services
and social interactions, and driving local and global
economies. Developments since 1990 continue a his-
torical trend of increasing travel distances and a shift
from low- to high-speed transport modes that goes
along with GDP growth (Schäfer et al 2009, Gota
et al 2019). Only modest improvements in energy
efficiency have been realised, averaging 1.3% per
year globally, while carbon intensities have remained
stable (figure 14). Overall, global increases in pas-
senger and freight travel activity levels have out-
paced energy efficiency and fuel economy improve-
ments, continuing a long-term trend for the trans-
port sector (Gucwa and Schäfer 2013, Grübler 2015,
McKinnon 2016).
While global passenger activity has expanded
in all world regions, great disparities exist between
low and high income regions, and within coun-
tries between urban and rural areas (ITF 2019).
These disparities are visible comparing regional levels
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Figure 14. Kaya decomposition of CO2 emissions drivers for the transport sector. The indicated growth rates are averaged across
the years 2010–2018. Note that the energy term by itself is not part of the decomposition, but is depicted here for comparison
with the Kaya factors. This figure is for fossil fuel CO2 emissions only (indirect CO2 emissions are excluded) in order to ensure
compatibility with underlying energy data.
of transport emissions (figure 13), and are largely
due to differences in modal split and motor vehicle
use. Europe and North America underwent a rapid
increase in private car use in the 20th century, which
has come to dominate most passenger travel activ-
ity and emissions, accounting in 2017 for 70.9% of
passenger-km by motorised transport in the EU-
28, and 81.1% in the US (EC 2019). However, the
growth of passenger-km in the OECD has con-
siderably slowed, down to an increase of just 1%
between 2000 and 2017 (SLoCaT 2018). It is not
clear whether the so-called ‘peak car’ in developed
economies is simply the result of economic stag-
nation and rising fuel prices or whether it reflects
deeper lifestyle and demographic change (Goodwin
and van Dender 2013, Kuhnimhof et al 2013, Bastian
et al 2016). Meanwhile, emerging countries in the
global South are becoming more car dependent, with
rapidly growing motorisation and urban sprawl, and
the emergence of local automotive production, while
public transport struggles to provide adequate service
(Dargay et al 2007, Hansen and Nielsen 2017, Pojani
and Stead 2017). Between 2000 and 2017 global pas-
senger travel increased in non-OECD countries by
169%, starting from a low baseline (SLoCaT 2018).
Passenger and freight mobility services have seen
far reaching advances, aided by information and
communication technologies tools that have fostered
e-commerce andmobility sharing platforms. The eas-
ing of traveling and the lowering of cost conditions
attained through use of innovative business mod-
els and information technology have contributed as
drivers of increasing transport demand and have
shaped the way people and goods travel around the
globe (Smidfelt Rosqvist and Hiselius 2016). Freight
travel activity grew across the globe by 68% in the last
two decades driven by global GDP increases, together
with the proliferation of online commerce and rapid
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(i.e. same-day and next-day) delivery (SLoCaT 2018).
Growth has been particularly rapid in heavy-duty
road freight transport.
The transport sector global energy intensity
dropped by an average of 1.3% per year between 2010
and 2018, primarily driven by wealthier regions, but
was relatively level or increasing in all other regions
(figure 14). Some countries have mobilised policies
to increase vehicle energy efficiency, stimulating tech-
nological improvements that steadily reduced the
required energy use per passenger-km and per tonne-
km of goods delivery for all vehicle applications (light
duty, heavy duty and rail) (IEA 2019a). Yet progress
in another key policy area, fuel price reform, has
beenmoremixed: fuel taxes increased in 83 countries,
but fell in 46 between 2003 and 2015, despite their
importance in encouraging the purchase of more effi-
cient vehicles and in limiting travel demand (Bastian
et al 2016, Ross et al 2017).
The energy matrix of the global transport sys-
tem remains to the present deeply rooted in fossil
fuels, with powertrains depending on gasoline and
diesel fuels accounting for 92% of final energy use in
the light duty vehicle segment (Figueroa et al 2014,
IEA 2019a). The carbon intensity of the transport
sector has remained unchanged between 2010 and
2018 in all world regions (figure 14). In part this
is due to the increasing adoption of larger, heavier
combustion-based vehicles (‘sports utility vehicles’
or SUVs), which have tended to far outpace elec-
tric and hybrid vehicle sales. Historically this has
taken place in the North American car market,
but is increasingly the case in Europe and interna-
tional markets, with 39% of vehicles sold globally
in 2018 in the category of SUVs (IEA 2020d). In
terms of car size and weight, stringent material effi-
ciency and light-weight design of passenger vehicles
alone could cumulatively reduce global GHG emis-
sions until 2060 by 16–39 GtCO2eq (Pauliuk et al
2020). Since 2011, there has also been a steady and
increasingly steep decline in the market share of
more carbon-efficient diesel vehicles in EU-28 coun-
tries; starting in 2017 these developments reversed
the previously downward trend of average fuel con-
sumption for newly registered vehicles in Europe
(IEA 2020b).
While accounting for a small share of total GHG
emissions, national and international aviation and
shipping play a fast-growing role, with annual growth
rates of +4.2% and 3.1% respectively between 1990
and 2018. Energy efficiency improvements in avi-
ation were considerably larger than in road trans-
port, but were outpaced by even larger increases
in activity levels (SLoCaT 2018, Lee et al 2021). In
2016, aviation accounted for 31% of tourist arrivals
globally (up from 17% in 2005), and for 50%
of transport-related CO2 emissions from tourism
(UNWTO 2019). The long term impact of the Covid-
19 pandemic is uncertain but it has severely impacted
global passenger aviation in 2020, and to different
extent the movement of goods and freight modes (Le
Quéré et al 2020, Newman AO 2020).
Overall, transport trends reveal a steady increase
of emissions, overwhelmingly driven by growing
motorisation and road transport activity. This global
trend is opposite to what is needed, with a shift
from lower to higher-carbon modes only minim-
ally offset by efficiency gains. In recent years, hybrid
electric and fully battery electric vehicles however,
are becoming increasingly popular (IEA 2019b) and
electrification has progressed faster than previously
expected just a few years ago, especially in scooters,
buses and a variety of micromobility and light urban
freight modes such as e-bikes and e-autorickshaws
(Taiebat and Xu 2019). Yet while the electrification
of road transport holds much promise, its impact
has been hardly visible in the period up to 2018,
and looking forward it is in danger of being off-
set by growing levels of travel activity and coun-
tervailing trends such as increasing vehicle size and
weight. This suggests a key role for more stringent
policies and efforts to tackle car dependence, includ-
ing demand management policies alongside techno-
logical innovation (Creutzig et al 2018, Mattioli et al
2020,Milovanoff et al 2020). Demandmanagement is
even more crucial for subsectors like aviation where
technological options for decarbonisation are cur-
rently very limited.
3.6. AFOLU
AFOLU sector emissions and removals reached 11.6
GtCO2eq globally in 2018, or approximately 21% of
global GHG emissions. Reporting in the AFOLU sec-
tor is split into two major components: CO2 emis-
sions and removals from land-use change and man-
agement (also known as LULUCF—land use, land use
change and forestry); and emissions from agriculture,
which are predominantly CH4 and N2O.
Land use change andmanagement CO2 emissions
and removals account for 47% of net emissions in
the AFOLU sector and are one of the largest global
subsectors at 5.4 Gt CO2eq. A variety of land-based
carbon fluxes make up these emissions, including:
(a) deforestation (e.g. the clearing of natural vegeta-
tion for agricultural purposes); (b) transformations
between croplands and pasture; (c) peat drainage
and burning; (d) wood harvesting; (e) the regrowth
of forest and other natural vegetation after agricul-
tural abandonment and harvest; and (f) soil CO2 flux
due to grassland and cropland management (Hansis
et al 2015, Houghton and Nassikas 2017, Gasser et al
2020).
Emissions from agriculture are mainly com-
prised of CH4 emissions from enteric fermentation
(e.g. cattle and sheep digestion), at 2.8 GtCO2eq in
2018, or 25% of the sector total. Smaller emissions
components include managed soils and pasture (1.3
GtCO2eq, 11% of total), rice cultivation (1 GtCO2eq,
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Figure 15. Global and regional GHG emissions trends for the AFOLU sector. Panel (b) shows emissions at the years 1990, 2000,
2010, and 2018.
9% of total), and manure management, biomass
burning, and synthetic fertiliser application (together
1 GtCO2eq). These agricultural sources are mainly
CH4 and N2O emissions. Like land-use and manage-
ment CO2 emissions, they are subject to considerable
uncertainty (section 2.5).
There has been a gradual upward trend of AFOLU
emissions since 2000, at rates of 0.8%/yr. Region-
ally, this growth has played out via differing patterns
of land use and ongoing agricultural transitions.
Unlike all other sectors, AFOLU emissions are typ-
ically higher in developing compared to developed
regions. In Africa, Latin America and South East Asia,
CO2 emissions associated with land-use change and
management predominate, dwarfing other AFOLU
and non-AFOLU sources, and making AFOLU the
single largest sector at more than 50% of emissions
in these regions. Land-use and management emis-
sions here is associated with the expansion of agri-
culture into carbon-dense tropical forest areas, where
vast quantities of CO2 emissions are released due to
the removal and burning of biomass, and draining
of carbon rich soils (Pearson et al 2017, IPCC 2019,
Hong et al 2021).
By contrast, in Europe and North America, the
highest rates of land clearing occurred well before the
20th century, such that legacy land use CO2 emissions
are now negligible (Pongratz and Caldeira 2012). In
Europe, recent forest regrowth and regeneration on
abandoned agricultural land has led to an increase
of carbon stocks and CO2 removals since at least
2010 (figure 15). Agricultural N2O and CH4 emis-
sions therefore have a substantially larger share of
overall AFOLU emissions in these regions compared
to tropical countries (Hong et al 2021).
Livestock rearing takes place on vast tracts of pas-
ture land worldwide, contributing to large quantities
of CH4 emissions from enteric fermentation in Latin
America (0.7 Gt CO2eq in 2018), Southern Asia (0.5
GtCO2eq) and Africa (0.5 GtCO2eq), while also play-
ing a sizable role in the total AFOLU emissions of
most other regions. Other emissions components are
more specific to regions, such as rice cultivation in
East, Southern, and South East Asia; biomass burn-
ing in Africa and Asia-Pacific Developed; andmanure
management in Europe and North America.
Trends in AFOLU emissions from 2010 to 2017
have been driven by increases in population, in par-
ticular in Africa, the Middle East, Southern Asia and
South East Asia and Developing Pacific, increases in
agricultural production per capita in all regions but
theMiddle East, and increases in emissions per unit of
land area. The main downward driver was reductions
in the amount of land required per unit of agricultural
and forestry production in all regions (−2.7%/yr
globally), reflecting agricultural intensification and
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Figure 16. Area and trend of land-uses in the world and selected regions. Data from the Land-Use Harmonization 2 database
(Hurtt et al 2020, Chini et al 2021).
technological progress. Notable features since the
1990s are the collapse of the Soviet Union, temporar-
ily increasing land intensity and reducing per-capita
production (Schierhorn et al 2019), and the increase
in the emissions intensity of land use where large
areas of pristine rainforest were cleared (in partic-
ular Africa, Latin America and Caribbean). Overall,
AFOLU emissions are either relatively stable or are
increasing steadily across most regions.
Land is the central, limiting resource for the pro-
duction of food, feed, timber, bioenergy and other
biocrops, mediated by growing population numbers,
dietary patterns, and production efficiency (Kastner
et al 2012). Large and on-going land-use andmanage-
ment CO2 emissions are consistent with a significant
global expansion of anthropogenic land-use between
1990 and 2018 (Hurtt et al 2020). Humans have
expanded cropland areas (+1.38 million km2, a 9.1%
increase), secondary forests (+5.73 million km2,
22.5%), and urban land (+0.24 million km2,
64.3%), and have simultaneously shrunk primary
forest areas (−7.25 million km2, −12.9%) (figure
16). These land-use changes have been led espe-
cially by Africa, Latin America, and Southeast Asia
(Hurtt et al 2020).
The AFOLU sector and its emissions impacts
are closely tied to global supply chains. Countries
like Brazil and Argentina use about half or more
of their cropland for products exported to other
countries, mainly the EU and China (Yu et al 2013).
Of the soybeans produced in Brazil—the number
two country-product combination with respect to
GHG emissions in the global AFOLU sector after
Indonesian rice (Hong et al 2021)—more than half
was exported to China in 2017 (zu Ermgassen
et al 2020). Difficulties in tracking supply chains
and limited corporate accountability result in such
exports often being associated with illegal deforest-
ation (Vasconcelos et al 2020). In South-East Asia,
particularly Indonesia, expansions of cropland by
0.18 million km2 (28%) was largely driven by inter-
national demand for palm oil, rubber, and plant-
ation products (Austin et al 2019, Xin et al 2021).
Here, expansion often occurs on peatlands, leading
to high emissions through peat draining (Conchedda
and Tubiello 2020) and peat burning (van der Werf
et al 2017). The strong increases in production per
capita and associated GHG emissions seen in Latin
America and South-East Asia (figure 17) are thus at
least partly attributable to growing exports and not
national dietary changes.
At the same time, efforts to promote environ-
mental sustainability in regions like the EU and
the US (but also fast-growing emerging econom-
ies such as China) can take place at the cost of
increasing land displacement elsewhere to meet their
own demand (Meyfroidt et al 2010, Yu et al 2013).
Creutzig et al (2019) emphasise these global connec-
tions via different country ‘archetypes’ that explain
co-occurring land use changes: ‘Consumers’ such as
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Figure 17. Kaya decomposition of GHG emissions drivers for the AFOLU sector. Reproduced from Hong et al (2021).The
indicated growth rates are averaged across the years 2010–2017. In contrast to other Kaya figures, here we show total GHG
emissions for the AFOLU sector.
Europe feature stagnating population, agricultural
intensification, and a high reliance on imports. ‘Pro-
ducers’ are regions with high biocapacity and low
institutional capacity such as South America, Russia,
Indonesia. In these countries, exports play a large role
for land-use trends. Other regions of Asia and Africa
belong to the ‘movers’, where high population growth
is rather the main driver.
GHG emissions per unit of land also increased
recently in tropical regions, as a portion of defor-
estation activities moved into carbon-dense rain-
forests. In Latin America, land-use and management
CO2 emissions grew from 1990 to 2010 (figure 15)
due to high continuous Amazon deforestation rates
until the mid-2000s alongside accumulating leg-
acy emissions (INPE 2020). However, deforestation
rates subsequently decreased until 2018 following
government initiatives and international moratoria
(Nepstad et al 2014). This trend in emissions is likely
to reverse past our time period of analysis, as the
2019 and 2020 seasons saw the highest Amazon defor-
estation rates since 2008 (Silva Junior et al 2021). In
other regions, emission intensity increases are often
due to an overall increase in agricultural intensifica-
tion, such as fertiliser application. The higher emis-
sion intensity for both land use CO2 and agricultural
emissions is the cost for requiring less land per unit
of production, which becomes evident in almost all
regions.
Global diets are a key driver of production per
capita, and thus land pressure and AFOLU emis-
sions. As per capita incomes rise and populations
urbanise, traditional diets that emphasise starchy
foods, legumes and vegetables transition towards
energy-intensive products such as refined sugars and
fats, oils and meat (Tilman and Clark 2014). At a
certain point in national development, diets thus
override population growth as the main driver of
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AFOLU emissions (Kastner et al 2012). Over the last
few decades, low- and middle-income countries such
as India, Brazil, Egypt, Mexico and South Africa
have experienced such a rapid dietary ‘westernisa-
tion’ (Pathak et al 2010, Vermeulen et al 2012, De
Carvalho et al 2013, Popkin 2015). Another driver of
higher food requirements per capita is food waste,
the amounts of which increased more or less con-
tinuously since the 1960s in all regions but Europe
(Porter and Reay 2016). Globally, 25%–30% of food
produced is lost, in particular at the consumer stage in
developed countries, and in the production, harvest-
ing and distribution stages in less developed countries
(Porter and Reay 2016, IPCC 2019). In other words, a
significant fraction of the world’s agricultural area is
used annually to produce food that is wasted.
Overall, the AFOLU sector contributes to one
quarter of global GHG emissions and the Paris Agree-
ment must include mitigation efforts from this sec-
tor. AFOLU emissions were rather constant between
1990 and the early 2000s, despite continuous popu-
lation growth and higher agricultural production per
capita in most regions. The key counteracting process
was less land required per unit of agricultural pro-
duction due to agricultural intensification. Starting in
2001, however, AFOLU emissions increased again due
to the clearing of pristine, carbon-dense forests. Trop-
ical regions across all continents cause the majority of
AFOLU emissions, with increasing emissions in Latin
America and Southeast Asia clearly linked to global
supply chains. These trends do not appear to be sta-
bilising, underlining the urgency of interventions at
all scales. Per capita emissions have also not fallen
below 0.5 tCO2eq in any region (Hong et al 2021),
suggesting a current frontier of mitigation efforts. If
there is a residual of AFOLU emissions that cannot
be eliminated, carbon dioxide removal methods such
as re/afforestation and biomass plantations with car-
bon capture and storage would be required to meet
stringent climate targets, further putting pressure on
global land resources (Allen et al 2018).
4. Conclusions
Global GHG emissions have continued their steady
rise, following over a century and a half of growth.
Emissions have risen across sectors and subsectors, in
electricity production, from industrial sources, land-
use andmanagement, and transport, through to com-
paratively small sources such as fugitive emissions,
waste burning and aviation. Among the major emit-
ting regions, recent trends show a picture of stable
emissions in North America and modest declines in
Europe, as fuel switching from coal to gas and the
ramp up of renewables start to take hold. The huge
emissions growth in Eastern Asia (China) is now also
slowing due to fewer coal power additions in recent
years. Together these trends led to a dampening of
growth in 2010–2018, compared to previous decades.
As emerging regions—Africa, Southern Asia, and
South East Asia—are now poised to accelerate eco-
nomic growth and establish high emitting infrastruc-
tures, it remains unclear whether a global peak in
greenhouse gases will be reached soon. Regardless,
recent growth has locked in a large body of infra-
structure that will continue driving emissions into the
future, in the absence of stringent climate policy or
early retirement.
Across sectors, there is a growing demand for the
products and services that underpin global emissions.
In part this is due to the physical expansion of
economies worldwide, with more infrastructures,
vehicles, buildings, supply chains and other mater-
ial stocks being put into place that demand energy
for their production and use. Unfortunately, prevail-
ing consumption patterns have also tended to aggrav-
ate energy use and emissions, with the long-term
trend led by developed regions. Residential build-
ings have grown larger, have fewer inhabitants, and
are heated and cooled to higher comfort standards.
Motor vehicles, too, have grown in size and are driven
over greater distances. Diets rich in meat and refined
products, internationally sourced, are globalising and
replacing traditional and seasonal produce. Regional
and local contexts account for much variation, and
there remains a chasm between the consumption
levels of the global North and the South, the poor
and the rich (Hubacek et al 2017, Oswald et al 2020,
Wiedmann et al 2020). Nonetheless, the overall trend
tracks towards westernised and highly unsustainable
norms and patterns of consumption, for a small but
growing global population.
Decarbonisation gains from improvements in
energy efficiency and switching towards lower-carbon
services across different sectors have been largely
wiped out by increases in demand (or in some cases a
trend towards higher carbon intensities). One excep-
tion is energy systems emissions in Europe, where
a combination of stable demand, energy efficiency
improvements, fuel switching and a scale up of renew-
ables has led to an absolute decline in emissions.
Other regions and sectors have deepened their reli-
ance on inefficient, carbon-intensive infrastructures
and production patterns. The continued failure to
decarbonise transport, and the recent expansion of
anthropogenic land-use into tropical rainforests, are
two notable examples. There are huge unexploited
mitigation potentials to be gained fromavoiding these
and other highly carbon-intensive activities, includ-
ing by adopting the best available technologies and
practices across sectors.
The energy systems, industry, buildings, trans-
port and AFOLU sectors are deeply interconnec-
ted. Important linkages are electrification and
heating, which ties emissions in the building and
industry sectors upstream to energy systems, and
material use, which ties embodied emissions in
buildings to the industry sector. Following the
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general trend of electrification, which has yet to
occur at scale in the transport sector, energy sys-
tem decarbonisation will further increase in import-
ance. Yet if the industry sector lags behind in
electrification and the decarbonisation of process
emissions (Davis et al 2018), it may become the
primary source of indirect emissions embodied in
the capital stocks of other sectors. Indeed, GHG
emissions embodied in buildings and infrastruc-
ture, machinery and transport equipment already
exceed 50% of their present carbon footprint (Chen
et al 2018). Multi-sector and integrated policies
are therefore crucial for meeting the mitigation
challenge.
Overall, sectoral trends reveal limited progress
towards decarbonisation. The prominent global pat-
tern is a continuation of underlying drivers with few
signs of emerging limits to demand, nor of a deep
shift towards the delivery of low and zero carbon ser-
vices across sectors. The main gap in knowledge is
how rapid technological transitions, demand man-
agement and alternative economic models could be
implemented to mitigate these persistent and power-
ful upward drivers. Linked to this is the question of
how the physical material throughput of econom-
ies can be reduced without jeopardising economic
and social well-being. Above all, there is a neglect
of research on transitions towards even more unsus-
tainable technologies and practices (Antal et al 2020).
Climate mitigation cannot be achieved if status-quo
trends continue, nor if low-carbon technologies and
practices are left to gradually phase-in on an uneven
playing field. Meeting the Paris Agreement goals of
1.5 ◦C and 2 ◦C requires policies that ensure sustain-
able land-use practices, limit excessive demand, and
actively phase out fossil fuels.
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